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NOTES
MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),' although it
marked a significant step on the path toward improving the quality of the
environment, fell short of becoming a panacea by its failure to delineate
clearly the substantive rights which the legislation was designed to enforce. In
view of expanding concepts of standing and reviewability, NEPA has pro-
duced a great deal of litigation in the past few years, much of it centered on
the standards of judicial review outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).2 The purpose of NEPA was to promote a national environmental
policy, but its broad and general terms seem to invite interpretational dispute,
and implementation of its provisions has yet to be carried out uniformly.
Congress' failure to establish definite standards has left delineation of NEPA's
mandate to the slower, more haphazard process of judicial review of agency
actions. Initially, some courts were unwilling to review an agency's findings
concerning the environmental impact of their action under any standard.
However, courts now recognize their obligation to review substantive
findings, but most use the narrow "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
APA. Until courts are willing to engage in a more thorough review of
environmental impact, at a minimum, they must continue to emphasize and
expand the procedural duties mandated by NEPA and to review more closely
how agencies make their decisions. Such has been the perceptible trend in
NEPA litigation.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NEPA
NEPA was enacted after Congress realized that, although national policies
were not designed to cause environmental damage, they did little to prevent
it.3 Those policies were designed mainly to enhance material wealth 4 and thus
planning became "the exclusive province of the engineer and the cost
analyst." 5 The humanistic viewpoint, concerned with man's relationship with
the environment, was being "overlooked or purposely ignored."'6 Congress
realized that actions having possible irreversible consequences were being
undertaken without adequate consideration of their impact. Congress hoped
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970) (effective January 1, 1970).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
3. S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report], NEPA
is legislation passed "to protect the environment against the government" Leventhal, Environ-
mental Decision-making and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev 509, 510 (1974).
4. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 5.
5. 115 Cong. Rec. 40,420 (1969).
6. Id.
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
to accomplish three goals with NEPA. First, Congress wanted to restore
public confidence in the federal government's ability not only to achieve
important public goals, 7 but also to maintain and enhance the quality of the
environment. Second, it hoped to shift the emphasis towards handling envi-
ronmental problems on a "preventive and ... anticipatory basis" 8 rather than
on a remedial one. Third, by using an "interdisciplinary approach" 9-with
consideration given not only to the opinions of engineers and cost analysts but
also to those of economists, sociologists, and landscape architects' 0 -decisions
would be made with a more humanistic emphasis. Finally, NEPA was to
provide all federal officials with a legislative mandate to consider the conse-
quences of their actions on the environment. Consciousness-raising was
necessary because "[a]s a nation we have no controlling ethical relationship
with our natural environment; some persons wish to exploit, others to
preserve, and most are in between." 11 Therefore, by setting forth a statement
of national policy and a declaration of national goals, 2 some controlling
relationship between man and the environment could perhaps be fostered. As
NEPA states:
The purposes of this [Act] are: To declare a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality. 13
The Council on Environmental Quality was not given any actual authority to
review and enforce agency compliance. 14 Its purpose was to provide an
organization at the highest level of government whose focus would be on
environmental management, with one of its tasks being to "recommend
national policies [and] to promote the improvement of the quality of the
environment."1Is It was not vested with any legal authority and has no
regulatory functions. It does have the duty to issue guidelines 16 to assist
agencies in their preparation of detailed environmental statements required by
7. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 8. Such goals consist of "material wealth, greater
productivity, and other important values." Id. at 8-9.
8. 115 Cong. Rec. 40,416 (1969).
9. NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XA) (1970).
10. 115 Cong. Rec. 40,420 (1969).
11. 1 A. Reitze, Environmental Law 1 (1972). The author discusses how, in the absence of
such a relationship, legal change comes very slowly.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). "In many respects, the only precedent and parallel . . . is the
Full Employment Act of 1946, which declared an historic national policy on management of the
economy . . . ." 113 Cong. Rec. 40,416 (1969).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
14. Id. § 4342 (1970); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1975); see list of duties and functions outlined
in 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1975).
16. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 271 (1974).
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NEPA. These guidelines, 17 though purely advisory, 18 are entitled to deference
by agencies and the courts. 19
The detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) is the crux of NEPA. 20
It is the device created by Congress to insure that consideration would be
given to environmental quality and management 2l when "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" are
proposed. 22 Its purpose is to "build into the agency decision making process
an appropriate and careful consideration of the environmental aspects of
proposed action and to assist agencies in implementing not only the letter, but
the spirit, of the Act." 23 This distinction between the "letter" and the "spirit"
(minimal procedural as opposed to enthusiastic substantive compliance with
NEPA), combined with the fact that an EIS is required only for "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,"
have caused non-uniformity in the implementation of NEPA.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NEPA
A. Development
Since administrative agencies, to a large extent, control the use of most
natural resources, the restoration and maintenance of the environment rests in
their hands. Thus, environmental litigation almost inevitably involves the
problem of judicial control of such agencies. No mention of the judiciary is
made in NEPA; nor is there any indication in the legislative history that
Congress intended the courts to review agency compliance with NEPA.2
4 Yet
17. 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1975).
18. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973).
19. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1975) (No. 552); see Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d
412, 421 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
20. This detailed statement should contain: "(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-
term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productiv-
ity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved
in the proposed action should it be implemented." NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC)
(1970).
21. Such consideration is to be insured by requiring proposed environmental statements to be
circulated to other federal, state, and local agencies and to be made available to the public for
comment. The final statements are to be drawn in such fashion as to be responsive to comments
received. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.2(b), 1500.7 (1974).
22. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
23. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971); see Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 417
n.12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) (endorsing the quoted language).
24. Absent a clear, contrary expression of Congressional intent, judicial review should not be
limited; there is a presumption of reviewability. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
141 (1967); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298-301 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
425 F.2d 97, 101-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970). See 4 K. Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise §§ 28.05, 28.06 (1958).
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the courts have become the overseers of NEPA2 s through their review of
agencies' EIS determinations.
The courts' willingness to take cognizance of such challenges to agency
determinations concerning environmental impact statements reflects a
liberalized attitude toward judicial review of administrative agency decisions.
Numerous reasons have been advanced to explain this attitude, but two are
particularly compelling. First, NEPA was enacted when "courts were gener-
ally tightening their review of agency decision making, so that they welcomed
NEPA as an additional statutory basis for dose judicial review .. ."26
Second, the courts may be evolving a higher standard of review in environ-
mental cases. "Judicial review as it evolved in the heyday of economic
regulation may be inadequate for today's agency decisions affecting health,
life, and similar intensely personal interests, which have always had a special
claim to judicial protection." 27 Indeed, it has been recognized that, absent the
right to a healthful environment, one may be deprived of all rights. 28
Evidence of this is the expansion of standing to sue in environmental cases.29
If litigants had to prove economic injury in order to challenge action which
they felt was damaging their environment rather than their pocketbook, few
such cases would be brought.30 As long as a plaintiff can show that he has
25. It has been said that the court's role is to make the promise of environmental legislation a
reality. The promise referred to is "the commitment of the Government to control, at long last,
the destructive engine of material 'progress.'" Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm.. Inc. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The courts are to do this by seeing that "important legislative
purposes [NEPA's, for instance], heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in
the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy." Id.
26. Comment, The Environmental Policy Act: How It Is Working, How It Should Work, 4
Environmental L. Rep. 10,003, 10,004 (1974).
27. Id.
28. 115 Cong. Rec. 40,419 (1969). Section 101(c) of NEPA originally read: "The Congress
recognizes that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment
.... " Id. at 40,416 (italics omitted). As such, it would have clearly created substantive rights
under NEPA, but this was changed by the Conference Committee to its present form "that each
person should enjoy a healthful environment ... " Id. at 40,419. Senator Jackson, Chairman of
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to which the bill was referred, opposed the change.
He felt that the Senate bill only expressed what was already the law of the land. Id. at 40,416.
29. The landmark cases on the subject of standing to sue when the claimed injury is more
aesthetic than economic are Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), and United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). At issue was
the meaning of "a person ... aggrieved" under section 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). In
Sierra Club, the Court held that a person aggrieved must suffer "injury in fact" (405 U.S. at 734)
and that the appellants had failed to allege such injury. However, in SCRAP, the Court found
that the appellees had "sufficiently alleged that they were 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved.' "412
U.S. at 685.
30. As it is, plaintiffs have enough obstacles to overcome. The relaxation of standing
requirements only eased in part the difficulty of bringing an environmental suit. Often plaintiffs
in environmental cases are groups organized in an ad hoc fashion to challenge a particular
operation or project. E.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
Since NEPA's EIS requirement applies only to federal actions, the plaintiff's adversary inevitably
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suffered or will suffer injury, economic or otherwise, he will be deemed to
have standing to raise his environmental claim.
Environmental cases which arose before the enactment of NEPA or which
were not brought under NEPA show that the environment is afforded special
treatment in the eyes of the law.3 1 Therefore, when NEPA was passed courts
could easily view it as an authorization for "special judicial solicitude of those
who seek pro bono publico to ensure that the Government and its agents live
up to [its demands]."'32
B. Procedural versus Substantive Distinction
Early in NEPA litigation the question arose as to what judicially enforce-
able duties had been created under NEPA's vague mandate. Under section
101, federal agencies were "to use all practicable means" to foster the quality
of the environment; 33 under section 102, agencies were to carry out "to the
fullest extent possible" the procedures outlined therein.3 4 When the meaning
of a particular statutory term is in doubt, the courts will look to Congressional
intent; in this case Congress clearly intended full agency compliance. 35 NEPA
was intended to be "concerned with principle rather than detail; with an
expression of broad national goals rather than narrow and specific procedures
for implementation. '36 Section 102 was intended to establish "action-forcing"
procedures to insure that the basic substantive policy of section 101 be
followed. 37 NEPA did not intend solely "[p]roforma compliance" 38 nor did it
intend merely that these "detailed impact studies . . . fill governmental
archives."'39 Its primary purpose was to "compel federal agencies to give
is an agency of the government. Considering the cost and complexity of environmental litigation,
this is certainly a disadvantage.
An additional issue resolved generally in favor of plaintiffs in NEPA litigation is whether the
defense of laches is available. Most courts have given laches a "lukewarm reception" since it Is
not only the plaintiff who suffers from an agency's actions if the suit is dismissed and the agency
avoids compliance with NEPA, but also the general public. E.g., Cady v. Morton, No. 74-1984
at 8 (9th Cir., June 19, 1975), quoting Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498
F.2d 1314, 1324 (8th Cir. 1974) (collecting cases).
31. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Udall v. FPC,
387 U.S. 428 (1967); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir,
1971); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 949 (1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
32. 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 238 (D. Conn. 1974).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
34. Id. § 4332 (1970).
35. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1176 (6th Cir. 1972).
36. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 9.
37. 115 Cong. Rec. 40,419 (1969); Senate Report, supra note 3, at 19; Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
931 (1973).
38. Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1972).
39. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
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serious weight to environmental factors in making discretionary choices."40 In
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC,4 I although the court found
that the substantive policy of section 101 left room "for a responsible exercise
of discretion," the procedural provisions were found to require strict com-
pliance. 42 Under section 102, Congress authorized and directed federal
agencies to perform the EIS requirement "to the fullest extent possible."43
Each federal agency is to comply unless there is an existing law applicable to
the agency's operations which makes compliance impossible." Thus, absent a
clear conflict of statutory authority, section 102 duties must be complied with
fully.45
The Calvert Cliffs' decision established that courts could review agency
action under NEPA, but that such review would not be uniform. Agency
action under the substantive directives of section 101 was to be reviewed
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, while procedural compliance
under section 102 would be more strictly reviewed. 4 6
An analogous standard of review was set forth in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 47 The suit in Overton was not brought under
NEPA, but rather concerned an alleged violation of the Department of
Transportation Act of 196648 and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968.49
40. Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693. 697 (2d Cir. 1972);
see Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
41. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
42. Id. at 1112. Petitioners claimed that the rules promulgated by the AEC to effect
environmental consideration were too lenient to comply with NEPA. AEC argued that NEPA's
vagueness allowed for much discretion. The court disagreed; it stated that, unlike section 101,
section 102 "mandate[d] a particular sort of careful and informed decisionmaking process .
which was to be rigorously enforced. Id. at 1115.
43. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). The House amendment provided that "nothing in
this Act shall increase, decrease or change any responsibility or authority of any Federal...
agency created by other provision of law." 115 Cong. Rec. 40,418 (1969). This would seem to
require a different standard of compliance than that required by the present terminology. But
neither in the view of the Senate conferees nor in that of the House conferees was this semantic
change in any way meant to limit the Congressional directive to all federal agencies to carry out
the policies of the Act. Id.
44. 115 Cong. Rec. 40,418 (1969). The House conferees went further and added that "no
agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its existing statutory authorizations to
avoid compliance." Id. at 39,703. "IT]he words [to the fullest extent possible] are an injunction to
all federal agencies to exert utmost efforts to apply NEPA to their own operations. In short, the
phrase... reinforces rather than dilutes the strength of the prescribed obligations." Ely v. Velde,
451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971).
45. 449 F.2d at 1115. The court took this into consideration when it stated: "We must stress
as forcefully as possible that this language ['to the fullest extent possible'] does not provide an
escape hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA's procedural requirements
somehow 'discretionary.' Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger. Indeed, the
requirement of environmental consideration 'to the fullest extent possible' sets a high standard for
the agencies .... " Id. at 1114.
46. Id. at 1115.
47. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
48. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(o (1970).
49. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
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These acts forbid the use of federal funds for highway construction through
public parks if a "feasible and prudent" alternative route exists. If there is no
alternative, the construction program must include all possible planning to
minimize harm to the park.5 0 Overton's landmark decision expanded the
concept of judicial review5 ' in that it called for a penetrating inquiry by the
court to see if all relevant environmental factors should ever be considered by
the agency.5 2 The in-depth review espoused by Overton has been used in
NEPA cases to test initial determinations of the need for an EIS. 3 Yet, as
Overton made clear, the ultimate decision based upon the weighing of
environmental considerations is to be reviewed under a much narrower
standard of review-the "arbitrary, capricious, [or] abuse of discretion"
standard.5 4 This standard, coupled with the presumption of validity which
50. Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
51. This is true even though the Court applied a narrower standard of review than that
sought by petitioners who sought the application of the substantial evidence test or, in the
alternative, de novo review. 401 U.S. at 414. The former requires the reviewing court to consider
all evidence and then exercise its own judgment as to whether there is sufficient evidence
supporting the agency's action. De novo review requires independent factfinding by the court.
The Court stated that neither of these standards was applicable. It limited the substantial
evidence test to instances "when the agency action is taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of
the [APA] itself ... or when the agency action is based on a public adjudicatory hearing." Id. at
414 (citations omitted). De novo review was also limited to two situations: (I) when action is
adjudicatory and the agency's factfinding procedures inadequate and (2) when new issues are
raised in proceedings to enforce non-adjudicatory agency action. Id. at 415.
52. Id. at 416.
53. See cases cited in notes 57 and 67 infra. There is a similarity between the Acts in Overton
and NEPA. Both call for consideration of alternatives and planning to minimize harm, but the
difference lies in the fact that the Acts in Overton require an alternative to be taken if one exists
whereas NEPA does not mandate any specific action. Compare NEPA § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(CXiii) (1970) with 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970) and 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (1970). This standard presumes that administrative agencies possess
expertise in environmental affairs, and thus that the agency has made the best decision possible,
Yet, as suggested by some writers, environmental litigation, like any other litigation, requires the
particular skills of judges to balance opposing interests. Practicing Law Institute, Legal Control
of the Environment 314 (1970).
The approach to judicial review of the administrative process taken by the Court in Overton
has been termed the "New Era" view. F. Anderson, Some Perspectives on Environmental
Decision-Making in the Administrative Process, 4 Environmental L. Rep. 50,123, 50,126 (1974).
Two other views concerning the subject are the "pessimistic" (espoused by Professor Sax) and the
"status quo" views. Id. at 50,125-27. Proponents of the former contend that courts rather than
agencies should have the primary responsibility for environmental decision-making. They would
substitute a judicial balancing process, incorporating opposing economic and social interests for
administrative agency expertise. Id. at 50,127. The advocates of the "status quo" view feel that
the administrative process has worked reasonably well, whereas Congress and the courts have
performed inadequately. Id. at 50,125. Although Professor Sax' view would allow for in-depth
substantive review by the courts, this radical departure from traditional policy has not been
accepted. As Chief Justice Burger stated- "Our society and its governmental instrumentalities,
having been less than alert to the needs of our environment for generations, have now taken
protective steps. These developments, however praiseworthy, should not lead courts to exercise
equitable powers loosely or casually whenever a claim of 'environmental damage' is asserted. The
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attaches to agency decisions, 55 leaves substantive review of NEPA statements
somewhat limited. Under principles of administrative law, courts should
"intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies . . . but more
broadly if [they become] aware . . . that the agency has not really taken a
'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned
decision-making. '56 Thus, the real emphasis is on how the decision is made
and not on its substance. The procedural provisions of NEPA, as opposed to
the substantive, have therefore naturally been used as the vehicle for chal-
lenging agency operations which appear to threaten the environment.
C. Review of Negative Threshold EIS Determinations
Backed by the legislative history of NEPA and the Supreme Court's
decision in Overton, the standard which has evolved in some courts to test
threshold EIS determinations is the "rule of reasonableness" standard. This
was the standard of review explicitly held to govern judicial review of an
agency's threshold determination not to file an EIS in Save Our Ten Acres v.
Kreger.57 In this case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's refusal to enjoin the construction of a federal
office building in downtown Mobile, Alabama. The General Services Admin-
istration, the agency in charge of the construction, had decided that although
the action was "major," it would not significantly affect the quality of the
human environment. 58 The district court refused to enjoin the operation on
the grounds that this determination could not be set aside unless arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.5 9 On appeal the court said that a more
relaxed rule of reasonableness should be used: "The spirit of the Act would die
aborning if a facile, ex parte decision that the project was minor or did not
significantly affect the environment were too well shielded from impartial
review. '60 The court also noted that the General Services Administration's
world must go on .... Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 409 U.S. 1207, 1217-18 (1972) (opinion in chambers). In a subsequent decision
in Aberdeen, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with an ICC general revenue proceeding which
involved the preparation of an EIS. 95 S. Ct. 2336 (1975).
55. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 & n.30 (1971);
Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
56. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (footnote omitted).
57. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 465.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 466. The treatment of the terms "major" and "significantly" as two separate
criteria, both of which must be found before an EIS is required, has been criticized as allowving
the possibility that a "minor" action, though significantly affecting the environment, would not
require an EIS. "By bifurcating the statutory language, it would be possible to speak of a 'minor
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,' and to hold NEPA
inapplicable to such an action. Yet if the action has a significant effect, it is the intent of NEPA
that it should be the subject of the detailed consideration mandated by NEPA .... "Minnesota
Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1974). Unfortunately,
the guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality indicate that each criterion of the phrase
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contention that the stricter standard set forth in Overton only applies where a
statute expressly conditions the agency's actions on certain prerequisites was
"overly formalistic"'6' and thus without merit.
Under the "reasonableness" standard the court is to weigh the evidence of
both parties to determine if the agency could reasonably have concluded that
its proposed action does not constitute a "major Federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. '62 Where the agency's record
is inadequate, supplementary proof may be considered. 63 This relaxed stan-
dard of review gives less weight to an agency's initial determination that an
EIS is not required. It represents an expansion of Overton and thus differs
from the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. But this does not mean that it is
inconsistent with the APA. The APA provides that it is the reviewing court's
duty to decide questions of law. 64 Agency findings and conclusions are to be
set aside when arbitrary. 65 Therefore by interpreting the phrase "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment"6 6 as involving primarily questions of law, 67 rather than fact, the
reviewing court is no longer bound by the narrower standard. 68 Agency
decision-making generally involves mixed questions of fact and law. In such
"major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" must be met
separately. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(c) (1975).
61. 472 F.2d at 466.
62. Id. at 467 n.7 (italics omitted).
63. Id. at 467.
64. "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret. . . statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). Cf. Hanly v. Kleindienst,
471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (Hanly II) (reviewing court Is
to determine all questions of law de novo).
65. "The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law .... ." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
66. NEPA § 102(2XC), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
67. 471 F.2d at 828. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314,
1319 (8th Cir. 1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1248-49
(10th Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973). "Tlhe
administrative decision [not to file an EIS] was not one of discretion such as administrative
agencies have in innumerable matters and which is referred to in the general terms of § 706(2)(A)
.... NEPA's specific requirements in § 102 clearly speak in mandatory terms, and do not leave
the determination to administrative discretion. . . . Of course, there must be a determination
whether the statute applies and some area of judgment is involved. However, we are convinced
that the compass of the judgment to be made is narrow and that the determination must be
reasonable in the light of the mandatory requirements and high standards set by the statute." 484
F.2d at 1248-49.
68. The court in Hanly I and II recognized that they were not bound by the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard, but they failed to reject it. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 908 (1973) (Hanly II); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 648 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) (Hanly I). Similarly, in Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v.
Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973), the court found that although the challenge was made against
the procedural section of NEPA, the matter was ond requiring technical expertise. Id. at 1281.
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cases the standard of review adopted by the court should accord with that
which best serves the policy behind the statute. 69
The urgency of the problems facing the environment and the growing
concern on the part of the public prompted the enactment of NEPA. The
main goal of NEPA's requirement of an EIS was to insure that opposing
views and alternatives are weighed in the balance with technical and
economic factors70 thereby restoring public confidence in the ability of the
federal government to maintain a balance between economic and environmen-
tal considerations. 7 1 In order to promote this objective, agencies are required
to build into their decisionmaking process, beginning at the earliest possible point, an
appropriate and careful consideration of the environmental aspects of proposed action
in order that adverse environmental effects may be avoided or minimized . . .
For this requirement to be effective, courts must review agency determina-
tions at the earliest possible point. This requires in-depth review of an
agency's decision not to file an EIS. If agency action is totally shielded from
impartial review, as it is when courts refuse to effectively scrutinize even the
threshold decisions concerning the need for an EIS, NEPA's objective is
thwarted.
Not all courts have adopted the broader standard of review evolved from
Overton. Some still abide by the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the
APA, interpreting the phrase "major Federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment" as primarily a question of fact. But
included in this group are some courts which require a statement of reasons
why an EIS was found to be unnecessary. 73 This requirement is somewhat
consistent with NEPA's intent because, without a statement of reasons, the
reviewing court has no way of knowing whether or not the agency has made
its decision arbitrarily. In NEPA, Congress was in effect saying that decisions
concerning actions which will significantly affect the quality of the human
environment can no longer be left solely to administrative agency expertise.
7 4
69. 16 B. C. Ind. & Coin. L. Rev. 663, 667-68 (1975). See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823.
829 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), citing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S.
111, 131 (1944) (with respect to mixed questions of fact and law the Supreme Court uses a rational
basis test).
70. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1975).
71. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 8.
72. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1975) (emphasis added).
73. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). This
requirement was later expanded in Hanly I when the court called for public notice before a
threshold determination was made. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 836 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
74. "Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with
and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has.. . special expertise with respect to
any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the
appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce
environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality and to the public .... 2NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). But cf. Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (absent dear-cut
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Although there is as yet no one standard used in all courts to test EIS
determinations, the trend is away from presuming that an agency has made a
satisfactory decision and toward demanding more of an agency, both in terms
of the consideration given the environment and the proof provided the public.
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES A MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION
The fact that NEPA's language is broad is not disputed; in fact, courts have
said that it is intentionally broad in order to cover the whole spectrum of
agency operations. 75 It is this very breadth and generality of terms which has
spurred most of the litigation arising under NEPA. The phrase most often the
subject of dispute is that of section 102(2)(C) which states that all federal
agencies shall
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official .... 76
There has been litigation on almost every aspect of this phrase's
terminology-the meaning of "major, ' 77 the meaning of "Federal, '7 8 whether
an action "significantly affects the environment," 79 whether an action affects
the "human" environment,8 0 and whether the "responsible official" can del-
egate to another the duty to prepare this detailed statement. 8' By claiming
that their actions do not fit the description set out in section 102(2)(C) agencies
have tried to avoid complying with the duty to file an EIS. In accordance
guidelines Congress was content to depend on agency's good faith determinations); Jicarilla Apache
Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1973).
75. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1975) (No. 552); Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v.
AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
76. NEPA § 102(2XC), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
77. E.g., Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir.
1972) (approval and 60% funding of expressway); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1032-33 (7th
Cir. 1972) (highway construction).
78. E.g., Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1975) (No. 510) (filing and approval of private action); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1975)
(No. 552) (issuance of coal leases).
79. E.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973) (construction of federal
office building claimed to result in severe parking and traffic problems); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471
F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (construction of office building and
detention center in Foley Square); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 788-89
(D. Me. 1972) (mock amphibious landing on beaches of state park).
80. E.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973)
(construction of detention center in downtown Manhattan).
81. E.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 849 (1972) (EIS must be prepared by the federal agency involved). As a result of the litigation
surrounding the sufficiency of an EIS when prepared by one other than the appropriate federal
agency, NEPA was amended to allow for a state agency or official to prepare the EIS in certain
instances. Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424.
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with its duty to aid policy makers in their decisions, 82 the Council on
Environmental Quality has issued guidelines 83 which help identify major
federal actions significantly affecting the environment. According to the
guidelines, the terms " 'major' and 'significantly' are intended to imply
thresholds of importance and impact ' 84 which, if met, would require the
agency to file an EIS. A federal action is one "where there is sufficient
Federal control and responsibility,"85 and this "action must be one that
significantly affects the quality of the human environment either by directly
affecting human beings or by indirectly affecting human beings through
adverse effects on the environment."8 6 None of these guidelines furnishes
specific standards and the terms remain vague and "amorphous. " 87 As a
result, the parameters of the phrase have been drawn by the courts. Examples
of projects held initially to constitute "major Federal action" are the building
of a dam, s8 highway construction 9 and the construction of a correctional
center.90 More recently, federal approval of otherwise private projects, 9 such
as the approval of coal leases, 9 2 has been held to be "major" action. Such
examples generally cover single projects of considerable magnitude. Later this
was expanded to include the cumulative effect of several individually "minor"
federal actions.9 3
One of the latest issues arising under this section is whether a comprehen-
sive impact statement must be filed for a combination of individually major
projects, each of which was already preparing a separate EIS. This question
was answered in Scientists' Institute For Public Infornation v. AEC
(SIPI).9 4 The plaintiffs in SIPI challenged the AEC's failure to issue a
comprehensive EIS to cover its Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program.
The AEC contended that NEPA does not require separate analysis of an
entire program, only detailed statements for particular facilities." To this the
court responded:
82. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1975).
83. Id. § 1500.
84. Id. § 1500.6(c).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 831 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
Speaking of the term "significantly," the court stated that as "'Llet the limits of the key term have
not been adequately defined by Congress or by guidelines issued by the CEQ." Id. at 830.
88. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
89. Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
90. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
91. Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1975) (No. 510).
92. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
93. E.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974)
(on-going activities of agency action commenced before effective date of NEPA).
94. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
95. Id. at 1085.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
Indeed, quite the contrary is true. "Individual actions that are related either geograph-
ically or as logical parts in a chain of contemplated actions may be more appropriately
evaluated in a single, program statement. 96
Similarly, in Conservation Society v. Secretary of Transportation,97 im-
provement was planned for a twenty-mile segment of U.S. Route 7, but the
court found that conversion of this route into a divided lane, limited access
highway was a "goal possible of accomplishment" and therefore held that
before such contemplated construction was undertaken, a comprehensive
study of the environmental impact was needed. 98
The question of when to issue an EIS is another consideration. In response
to the contention that an agency would be forced to speculate in order to issue
an EIS for a research and development program, 99 the SIPI court devised a
four-factor balancing test100 to be used in determining when a statement
should be filed. In applying its own test, the court decided that a statement
was necessary, even though no specific action had yet been taken to imple-
ment the program. The court also noted that the "environmental survey"
being prepared by the AEC would not be an adequate substitute for a NEPA
statement unless it contained the type of analysis and followed the procedures
required by NEPA.101
The latest decision in this area, Sierra Club v. Morton, 102 was more
complex in that the appellees, the Departments of the Interior, the Army, and
Agriculture, denied that they were even involved in a "program." They
contended that, until they themselves designated their individual actions as
such, they were exempt from the requirement of a comprehensive EIS. 03
96. Id. at 1087, quoting Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum to Federal
Agencies on Procedures for Improving Environmental Impact Statements (May 16, 1972).
97. 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 44 U.S.L.W. 3199
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
98. Id. at 930.
99. 481 F.2d at 1086.
100. "How likely is the technology to prove commerically feasible, and how soon will that
occur? To what extent is meaningful information presently available on the effects of application
of the technology and of alternatives and their effects? To what extent are irretrievable
commitments being made and options precluded as the development program progresses? How
severe will be the environmental effects if the technology does prove commercially feasible?" Id.
at 1094.
101. Id. at 1092. Since the agency has broad discretion as to the form and content of an EIS
there is no reason to issue a substitute to avoid complying with NEPA. Id.
102. 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1975)
(No. 552).
103. Id. at 873. In another recent case, Cady v. Morton, No. 74-1984 (9th Cir., June 19,
1975), the Bureau of Indian Affairs had approved leases covering over 30,000 acres of land, but It
had prepared an EIS covering only 770 acres. That the issuance of leases, including those
pertaining to Indian lands, constitutes "major federal action" had been established in an earlier
case, Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). Therefore, the issue here involved te
adequacy of the EIS. Defendants contended that since an adequate EIS had been prepared
governing a segment of the entire project, no comprehensive one was needed. The court
disagreed stating that "the breadth and scope of the possible projects made possible by . . .
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Appellants, on the other hand, relying on the guidelines issued by the Council
on Environmental Quality, contended that "whenever a group of individual
federal projects are related geographically, environmentally, or pro-
grammatically," a comprehensive statement is necessary.' 0 4 Faced with the
problem of whether to extend SIPI to cover situations where agencies deny
involvement in a broad program, the court rejected the appellees' restricted
construction of NEPA's requirements.' 0 5 The court further noted that "the
duty to plan comprehensively [may even] be imposed on the Government
apart from the duty to file an impact statement for comprehensive plans.' 10 6
The challenged agency action in Sierra Club was the development of the
valuable coal resources in the Northern Great Plains Province. Although the
Secretary of the Interior had ordered a study "to assess the potential social,
economic, and environmental impacts that development of the Province
would cause," 10 7 and had suspended the issuance of long-term coal leases
pending completion of an impact statement covering a national coal policy, '0 8
federal activity in the Province continued.' 0 9 The district court had found
that "[t]here is no existing or proposed Federal regional program, plan,
project, or other regional 'federal action' within the meaning of NEPA Section
102(2) for the development of coal. .. "110 and that "in the absence of regional
federal action, multiple applications for individual federal action" 1" do not
constitute major federal action and consequently, do not require a com-
prehensive impact statement. The court of appeals disagreed, stating:
when the federal government, through exercise of its power to approve leases ...
attempts to "control development" of a definite region, it is engaged in a regional
program constituting major federal action within the meaning of NEPA, whether it
labels its attempts a "plan," a "program," or nothing at all." '-
The decision that individually major actions may cumulatively constitute a
major federal action is fully consistent with the Council on Environmental
Quality's position that the statutory phrase, "major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment,"
is to be construed by agencies with a view to the overall, cumulative impact of the
approval of the leases require the type of comprehensive study that NEPA mandates adequately to
inform the Secretary of the possible environmental consequences of his approval." No. 74-1984 at 11.
104. 514 F.2d at 873.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 874.
107. Id. at 863.
108. Id. At the time this action was brought, a draft EIS had been issued pursuant to the
Secretary's order. It was highly criticized and a second draft was called for. Instead, however, the
Department of the Interior has gone ahead and issued the final impact statement despite the
controversy and challenge in court seems imminenL N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1975, § 1, at 21,
col. 1.
109. 514 F.2d at 864-65.
110. Id. at 867 (emphasis in original).
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 878.
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action proposed, related Federal actions and projects in the area, and further actions
contemplated .... [A]n environmental statement should be prepared if it is reasonable
to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment from Federal
action. 113
The question of timing of such a comprehensive EIS was also raised in
Sierra Club. Although the court found that major federal action was being
contemplated by the appellees, this did not ipso facto require the filing of a
comprehensive statement." 4 SIPI's four-factor test relating to timing was
adopted by the court and modified to apply to all federal actions:
[T]he agency, or the reviewing court, should inquire as follows: How likely is the
program to come to fruition, and how soon will that occur? To what extent is
meaningful information presently available on the effects of implementation of the
program, and of alternatives and their effects? To what extent are irretrievable
commitments being made and options precluded as refinement of the proposal pro-
gresses? How severe will be the environmental effects if the program is im-
plemented?"s
Applying these factors to appellees' actions proved inconclusive., " 6 Therefore,
the case was remanded so that appellees could determine if and when an EIS
would be needed." 7 The court indicated that a statement of reasons would be
113. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1975).
114. 514 F.2d at 879.
115. Id. at 880. The last two factors, the extent to which irretrievable commitments are being
made and the severity of environmental effects upon implementation, led to the denial of a
preliminary injunction in a recent case, New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Civil No.
75-2121 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 1975). In that case plaintiffs sought to enjoin the further transporta-
tion by air of plutonium and other nuclear materials (SNM). Plaintiffs claimed that failure to
comply with NEPA by not issuing an EIS constituted irreparable harm per se and thus justified
the issuance of an injunction. Judge Conner disagreed, stating that the cases supporting plaintiffs'
position involved "some Federal action, such as the construction of a building or highway or the
activating of a nuclear power plant, which could not be easily undone or changed. Thus it would
be impossible or at least impracticable to make the modifications which might subsequently be
indicated by an EIS." Id. at 7. The court failed to see that a denial of the injunction would make
future compliance with NEPA "a hollow gesture." Id. The court also noted that air trans-
portation of SNM had been going on for twenty-five years without incident. Id. at 9.
116. The court found that as for two of the factors the time for an EIS was ripe-meaningful
information was available, and the environmental consequences of coal development in tle
Province would be severe. Although the information had not yet been compiled, it is the mere
availability of the information which governs; the purpose of the EIS is to compile and analyze
the information. 514 F.2d at 880.
117. "The most usual form of judgment adverse to [the] agency is a remand" for further
fact finding. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 589 (1965). Perhaps this is tle
judgment most appropriate in NEPA litigation in light of the fact that NEPA was not intended to
establish environmental protection as an exclusive goal. Rather, Congress intended to restructure
priorities so that adequate consideration would be given to the environment when projects,
undertaken to achieve other ends, were proposed. "Although this sort of control (remanding a
cause to an agency for further findings) may seem to the layman ineffectual, or only a stalling of
the inevitable, . . . these demands for further findings can make a difference. It may encourage
the institution whose actions threaten the environment to really think about what it is doing, and
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required if the agencies determined that an EIS was unnecessary,'" and it
noted that such a determination could be challenged.11 9
The dissent in Sierra Club argued that, although forcing "the federal
government to engage in comprehensive long-range planning might in some
sense be socially 'good'," NEPA does not contain this requirement. 20 It also
felt that requiring an agency to justify its determination that an EIS is
unnecessary is inconsistent with NEPA and unduly burdensome since there
might be an "infinite number of 'negative' impact statements."''21 But this is
really not the case. It is true that NEPA did not mandate any particular level
of environmental quality; instead, it meant to encourage planning as a natural
part of any decisions significantly affecting the environment. '2 2 Therefore, in
the statement that agencies do not have to plan comprehensively, the most
important aspect of NEPA has been overlooked. The broader an agency's
anticipated actions are, the more severe the consequences on the environment
are likely to be. The argument that a "negative impact statement' is unduly
burdensome is equally unpersuasive because the agencies are permitted to
formulate this statement, as well as a regular EIS, in any manner they feel
appropriate, subject to a standard of reasonableness.12 3
V. CONCLUSION
In passing NEPA, Congress established a body of principles to govern
that is neither an ineffectual nor a small feat." C. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? 37 (1974)
(emphasis deleted).
118. 514 F.2d at 882. Compare with Hanly I and II, note 73 supra. In Sierra Club, not only
did the court require a statement of reasons but it also applied the reasonableness standard.
119. 514 F.2d at 882-83. An affirmative decision to file an impact statement may also be
challenged by attacking the adequacy of an EIS. Such appears to be the likely result of the
Department of the Interior's decision to issue a final EIS despite the public demand for a second
draft In a recent case, National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, No. 75-7048 (2d
Cir., Sept. 9, 1975), plaintiffs successfully challenged the defendant's failure to issue an adequate
comprehensive EIS. This case involved a dredging project in the Thames River to accommodate
a new class of submarines. The EIS covered only one project, although other groups intended to
dredge and dump the spoil at the same site. Although none had gained final approval, they were
"beyond the stage of mere speculation" and should have been included in the EIS. Id. at 6090.
120. 514 F.2d at 893 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 893 n.20. See also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 836-37 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Friendly, C. J., dissenting) (agency must now go through procedures formerly needed only when
an EIS was required-thus a threshold determination now becomes a mini-impact statement).
The dissent in Sierra Club argued that "the realm of things the federal government does not do is
still rather large." 514 F.2d at 893 n.20 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted). This
argument against requiring astatement of reasons, however, is ve y weak. It is precisely this type of
inaction and lack of actual environmental consideration which prompted NEPA's enactment. Senate
Report, supra note 3, at 4-5.
122. The Senate recognized the importance of long-range planning, stating that the "principal
threats to the environment... were the spinoff, the fallout, and the unanticipated consequences
which resulted from the pursuit of narrower, more immediate goals." Senate Report, supra note
3, at 8-9.
123. Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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federal agencies' decisions affecting the environment; neither Congress nor the
Council on Environmental Quality established any specific standard of envi-
ronmental concern to which agencies could refer.124 Instead, Congress' goal
was to "build" into the decision-making process a genuine change of thinking
which would mandate consideration of environmental factors as well as the
traditional technical and economic aspects of a proposed project. Such a
change in traditional policy would, understandably, be hard to implement,
particularly since the nation as a whole had not yet become environmentally-
oriented when NEPA was passed in 1969.12- But because Congress failed to
clearly delineate the substantive duties under NEPA, the courts, faced with
its interpretation according to the principles of review of administrative
agency action, were left with only one effective tool-the environmental
impact statement. It was decided early that courts had the obligation to
review agency compliance with NEPA's procedural requirements, 126 although
not all courts would engage in any substantive review. Subsequently, courts
scrutinized more closely agency decisions not to file an EIS, and were willing
to engage in review on the merits. Still, no one standard was established to
cover any phase of review, and as yet, five years after its enactment as a
national environmental policy, a national standard has yet to surface. But the
trend has been to expand the duties surrounding an EIS and to fill in the gaps
left by Congress. By requiring that comprehensive EIS's be issued, the courts
are following Congress' instruction to heed the long-term effects of agency
action. The government must use all practicable means to "fulfill the re-
sponsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations.' 12 7 The establishment of tests which are to balance clear-cut and
relevant factors 128 would cure any doubt about what constitutes compliance
and violation of NEPA.
Thus, it appears that the "policy" of environmental concern will become an
on-going part of agency planning, if only because conscientious plaintiffs
make it so. The court's willingness in Sierra Club to extend agency duties
even in light of a growing energy crisis is strong evidence that the environ-
ment has attained an important status in the hierarchy of national priorities.
If the courts' trend of steadily increasing agency duties under NEPA con-
tinues, NEPA will perhaps prove itself to be a truly effective weapon against
degradation of the nation's life support system.
Claire M. Desrosier
124. See notes 77-86 supra and accompanying text.
125. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
126. Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also notes
41-46 supra and accompanying text.
127. NEPA § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1970).
128. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1975) (No. 552); Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v.
AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see text accompanying notes 95 & IlI supra.
